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Collective Action Clauses (CACs) are among the most debated contract provisions in 
the world of sovereign finance. They provide a mechanism by which a majority of 
creditors can vote on modifications of the payment obligations to the debtor, while 
binding the minority of creditors. In theory, their impact on the cost of capital is unclear, 
since they have the potential to generate both costs (easier for the debtor to default) and 
benefits (reduced likelihood of hold outs). In this paper we study the impact of the 
introduction of CACs in Euro area sovereign bonds in January 2013 on secondary 
market yields. We find the following. First, the markets appear to price the new contract 
term, i.e., bonds with CACs trade at lower yields than otherwise similar bonds that do 
not include CACs.  Second, the yield differential between the two types of bonds 
decreases in a country’s creditworthiness. Third, the quality of the legal system matters 
to whether, and how, markets price these contract terms: The better the legal system, the 
larger is the yield reduction associated with CACs. The results suggest that CACs 
protect investors, and in particularly so when the sovereign is more likely to be in 
distress and in countries with better legal systems. 
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The European sovereign debt crisis that led to the 2012 Greek restructuring has revived discussions 
about the design of sovereign debt contracts and the pricing of contract provisions. These issues have 
been at the forefront of the policy and academic debate since the mid-1990s, when provisions 
specifying the minimum vote to modify payment terms (so-called Collective Action Clauses, 
henceforth abbreviated as “CACs”) were introduced as a contractual solution to avoid prolonged and 
costly battles following a default (Panizza, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2009); Aguiar and Amador 
(2014)). 
The interest in CACs and their impact began with the Mexican “Tequila” crisis in 1995 and the 
following extensive debate over whether the international system needed either a statutory sovereign 
bankruptcy regime or a contractual solution entailing CACs as a way to facilitate sovereign 
restructuring (see Häseler (2009)).1 Within this debate, the relevance of CACs on the pricing of debt 
was extensively discussed, but a consensus is still lacking. 
                                                 
1 The policy debate focused on emerging market countries issuing bonds to foreign investors under New York law, centered 
around the IMF proposal of a statutory sovereign debt restructuring mechanism. Failing to achieve consensus, the proposal 
was shelved and the inclusion of CACs prevailed as the only viable solution to facilitate debt restructuring for emerging 
countries (Gelpern and Gulati (2009)). The need for a bankruptcy regime for sovereigns (similar to the one that applies to 
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Theory is ambiguous concerning the extent to which the design of sovereign debt contracts matters 
as CACs introduce a trade-off from investors’ perspective. Kletzer (2004) and Haldane, Penalver, 
Saporta and Shin (2005) show that CACs improve the coordination among creditors and thus reduce 
the hold out problem, although they may induce delays in negotiation (Pitchford and Wright (2012)). In 
this respect, CACs represent pro-creditor provisions since, by facilitating restructuring, they improve 
investors’ recoveries in case of sovereign default. This in turn translates into lower bond yields. By 
contrast, Dooley (2000) and Shleifer (2003) argue that, as they make restructuring easier, CACs 
encourage opportunistic behavior on the side of the borrower in terms of strategic default, thus 
worsening the agency problem between government and creditors. From this perspective, CACs are 
anti-creditor provisions and lead to higher yields.  
In trying to disentangle which of these two effects dominates, the empirical literature has not 
reached consensus. While some studies do not find pricing differences associated with CAC provisions 
(e.g., Richards and Gugiatti (2003)), others document that the significance of the price impact depends 
on borrowers’ creditworthiness. Among these, CACs are associated with lower yields for good quality 
issuers and higher yields for bad quality issuers (Eichengreen and Mody (2004)), lower yields for bad 
quality borrowers only (Bradley and Gulati (2014)), or lower yields for middle quality issuers only 
(Bardozzetti, 2014 #3519}). Overall, the trade-off between orderly restructuring and moral hazard is far 
from resolved. 
Although these studies employ different samples (issuers and time period, primary versus secondary 
market), they share the focus on foreign law bonds issued by emerging countries. This bears on the 
analysis and its economic relevance in different ways. First, there is the matter of how to measure 
CACs. Many authors use the governing law as a proxy for the presence (or absence) of CACs and thus 
treat CAC provisions as a binary variable. The typical assumption, particularly in the early papers on 
this topic, was that bonds issued under English law have CACs, while those under New York law do 
not. However, as shown in Bradley and Gulati (2014), English and New York law bonds differ in 
contractual terms other than the inclusion of CACs; and the qualified threshold of creditors required for 
amending payment terms displays variation across contracts – even conditioning on the same law. 
Second, there is the question of how to identify the price impact of CACs. When issuing under foreign 
law, the vast majority of countries make use of either English or New York law, but rarely both. Thus, 
                                                                                                                                                                       
banks and non-financial firms) has recently gained renewed momentum (Bolton (2016)), along with proposals for a more 
explicit seniority structure (Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2015)). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2817041 
3 
 
even taking the jurisdiction of foreign law as a valid proxy for CAC provisions, the identification of the 
pricing effect comes from cross-country variation. Lastly, there is the concern about the sample size as 
most studies focus on foreign law bonds issued by emerging market countries which constitute only a 
sliver of the total government bond market (Gelpern and Gulati (2013)).  
Our goal in this paper is to study the pricing impact of CACs by making use of in a unique event – 
the mandatory introduction of CACs in bonds of Eurozone countries as of January 1, 2013. This 
initiative mandated the introduction of the same clause, which allows modification of the payment 
obligations subject the approval of qualified majorities of creditors, to all Eurozone countries, 
irrespective of the characteristics of the issuer and the law governing the issuance. In this respect, the 
Euro CAC initiative was exogenous to any particular Eurozone country.  
Despite the Euro CACs applying to bonds under both foreign and domestic law, we focus our 
analysis only on the latter. We do this for three reasons. First, we want to keep law fixed (domestic 
law) so as to better disentangle the impact of CAC provisions rather than mixing contract provisions 
with contract law. In other words, the inclusion of standardized and identical contract terms mandated 
by the Euro CAC initiative allows us to keep law fixed (e.g., German or Irish law) across a set of 
contracts and safely regard CACs inclusion as a binary variable.  
Second, the countries in our dataset issue the overwhelming majority of bonds under domestic law, 
while reverting to foreign law bonds only very sporadically. Thus, the focus on domestic law allows us 
to adopt a matching methodology whereby we compare bonds with similar characteristics (including 
the law) except the new provision. This methodology allows us to analyze the price effect of CACs 
within countries rather than across countries, and better disentangle the effect of the new contract 
provision.  
Finally, focusing on domestic (as opposed to foreign) law bonds allows us allows us to bring an 
understudied dimension to the debate by linking the price impact of CACs to the quality of the legal 
system.2 
We base our analysis of CACs under domestic law on the main insights of the literature on CACs 
under foreign law. As done in that context, we consider CACs to entail a trade-off between the benefits 
of more orderly restructurings on the one hand and the greater likelihood of strategic misbehavior by 
the government on the other hand.  We do this although we recognize that there may be differences in 
the enforcement of contract provisions across different laws. In particular, while it is the case that a 
                                                 
2 See also, Ratha, De and Kurlat (2018), comparing the pricing effects of CACs under New York law to those under English 
law. 
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local court might feel under greater pressure when the defendant in the case is its own government, the 
reason most developed nations are able to issue debt under their own laws is that they have built strong 
domestic institutions (such as independent judiciaries) to ensure that promises made by the 
governments themselves are considered credible.  To this end, most developed nations have domestic 
statutory and sometimes constitutional protections that allow for legal claims to be brought against the 
local government in the event of expropriation. This does not mean however that a creditor enjoys the 
same protection in a contract irrespective of the law the contract is written in. Rather one would expect 
that investors value the credibility of the legal systems as a protection against expropriation and thus 
are willing to pay a premium in proportion to the credibility of the legal system (Bradley, de Fontenay, 
de Lira Salvatierra and Gulati (2018)).3 Along these lines, the fact that the Euro area CAC initiative of 
January 2013 mandated the adoption of the same contract term across multiple different legal 
jurisdictions allow us to examine whether the impact of the CAC reform on yields is a function of the 
credibility of the legal system under which the CAC is adopted. 
We start our analysis by developing a very simple model of sovereign lending to illustrate the main 
trade-offs involved in the introduction of CAC bonds. The framework, based on Bolton and Jeanne 
(2009), has two main features. First, the sovereign is plagued by a classic “willingness-to-pay-
problem”, as in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) due to weak contractual enforcement. Second, given the 
sovereign has outstanding creditors holding different debt instruments (i.e., bonds with CACs and 
bonds without CACs), it can treat them differently in terms of repayments depending on the contractual 
features of the two bonds. The possibility of “selective default” implies that the two types of bonds may 
entail different yields in equilibrium.  
We show that the yield differential between CAC and no-CAC bonds depends on the likelihood of 
the sovereign engaging in a partial default (i.e., restructure the CAC bonds while defaulting on the no-
CAC bonds) versus strategic default (i.e., restructure the CAC bonds, while honoring the no-CAC 
bonds in full). When the former dominates, CAC bonds should trade at a premium relative to no-CAC 
bonds, while the opposite is true when strategic default is more relevant. Moreover, our model predicts 
the yield differential to be larger in countries with worse ratings and with better legal system.  
To test these implications, we compare the secondary market yields of Eurozone bonds issued under 
domestic law after January 1, 2013 (i.e., bonds with CAC provisions) with those of bonds issued prior 
                                                 
3 In line with this idea, prior research has shown that investors, even in the Euro area, and particularly during crisis times, 
pay a small premium for sovereign bonds under foreign as compared to local laws (Chamon, Schumacher and Trebesch 
(2018)). 
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to that date (i.e., bonds without CAC provisions). Given the large number of bonds issued by Eurozone 
countries under domestic law, we are able to match CAC bonds with no-CAC bonds issued by the same 
country, under the same law, denominated in the same currency and with similar residual maturities. 
Thus, we identify the price impact of CACs within countries rather than across countries, and using 
bonds that are close substitute.  
We find a significant yield differential: our estimates indicate that yields on CAC bonds are, on 
average, lower by 8 to 17 basis points (bps) than those of matched no-CAC bonds. Moreover, the yield 
differential between CAC and matched no-CAC bonds is persistently negative and statistically 
significant throughout the sample period. 
We then turn to test the model predictions that relate the price impact of CACs to the sovereign 
creditworthiness and quality of the legal system. To this end, we make use of cross-country 
heterogeneity in credit ratings and in quality of law indicators to examine whether the value of these 
contract provisions varies with investors’ expectation concerning country creditworthiness and legal 
enforcement. Consistent with the model, we document that the yield differential on CAC bonds relative 
to no-CAC bonds widens in countries with worse ratings and in those with stronger legal systems. 
Finally, we consider a falsification exercise where we assume that the Euro CAC initiative took 
place two years earlier than it actually did. To this end, we compare secondary market yields of 
pseudo-CAC bonds – i.e. Eurozone bonds issued under domestic law after January 1, 2011 – with those 
of same-issuer, same-law, same-currency bonds issued prior to that date (i.e., pseudo no-CAC bonds) 
that have similar residual maturities. Repeating all our analyses on this sample of bonds, we find no 
evidence of yield differentials across these bonds.  
To sum up, we document that CAC provisions in the domestic-law debt issued by Euro area 
countries are viewed favorably by market participants. We interpret this result as suggesting that the 
trade-off entailed by the CACs in terms of the benefits of more orderly creditors’ coordination versus 
the potential moral hazard costs from strategic default is resolved in favor of the former in our data 
sample. Anticipating this, investors are ready to pay higher prices for CAC bonds. Further, this price 
impact is more pronounced in countries with a sizable probability of partial default and, importantly, 
with a good quality legal system.  
Our paper relates to various strands of literature. First, being a study of the price impact of contract 
terms, our paper contributes to the literature analysing covenants in debt contracts (e.g., Smith and 
Warner (1979), Asquith, Beatty and Weber (2005), Bradley and Roberts (2015)). 
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Second, the view that the quality of the legal system affects the enforcement of contracts links our 
paper to the literature on institutions as defendants against property rights expropriation attempts by 
local governments (North and Weingast (1989); Stasavage (2002); Acemoglu and Johnson (2005); 
Breen and McMenamin (2013)). Specifically, the separation between enforcement and legislative 
bodies in our context works as a “checks and balances” mechanism against abuses of legislative power 
as described in Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997). 
Third, the paper relates to the growing literature on the relationship between effectiveness of courts 
and the evolution of contract provisions or economic outcomes (see, e.g., Anderlini, Felli and Riboni 
(2014); Gennaioli and Ponzetto (2015) for theoretical contributions; and Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (2003); Lerner and Schoar (2005); Qian and Strahan (2007) for empirical studies 
on the relationships between court enforcement and financial contracts such as mortgages or bank 
loans). Among these contributions, our study is most closely related to papers analyzing the impact of 
the quality of the legal system on trade. For example, in line with our result that better quality of law 
increases the price differential between CAC and no-CAC bonds, Levchenko (2007) and Nunn (2007) 
find that countries with good contract enforcement specialize in the production and export of goods for 
which relationship-specific investments are most important. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section I provides the background on the Euro CAC initiative 
and sets forth our predictions with the use of a simple model. Section II describes the dataset 
construction. Section III presents the empirical findings on the average price impact of CAC 
provisions, while Section IV exploits country heterogeneity. Section V presents some further results in 
terms of falsification tests and case studies. Section VI concludes. 
I. Background on the Euro CAC initiative and hypotheses 
CACs are contract provisions that generally allow for a supermajority of creditors in a single bond, 
or across bonds, to vote on modifications of the payment obligations to the debtor (with the permission 
of the debtor). By doing so, the provisions permit the debtor and a majority of creditors to agree to a 
reduction in the amount that the debtor owes in a fashion that forces the deal on a minority of 
dissenting creditors, thereby reducing holdouts (Eichengreen and Portes (1995)). In this sense, CACs 
are seen as a way to ameliorate the inefficiencies caused by intra-creditor problems, thus allowing 
investors to recover more in case of default of the sovereign (e.g., Haldane, Penalver, Saporta and Shin 
(2005)). Yet, by facilitating restructuring, CACs also may exacerbate the moral hazard problem 
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embedded in the sovereign’s lack of “willingness to pay” (e.g., Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)), whereby 
sovereigns cannot commit to repay creditors independently on their true payment capacity. Given this 
trade-off, the effect of CACs on bond yields is ambiguous, as it ultimately depends on the ability of the 
sovereign to pay and the political domestic constraints under which it operates.  
While being present in almost all foreign-law sovereign bonds since early 2000s, CACs have been 
almost completely absent in domestic-law bonds until the 2013 Euro CAC initiative. In this section, we 
describe the background of the Euro CAC initiative and then develop a simple model to derive 
predictions for our empirical analysis. 
A. Euro CAC initiative 
The sovereign debt crisis that hit the Eurozone in 2010-2013 developed in a number of stages 
culminating in the Greek sovereign debt restructuring. As a result, the Euro area policy makers put in 
place a number of measures including those aimed at ensuring that the resolution of future sovereign 
debt crises would not be so costly to the Euro system: CACs were a key element of this policy response 
(Hofmann (2014)). 
The Euro CAC initiative provides for the mandatory inclusion of standardized and identical CACs 
in all new Eurozone sovereign bonds issued after January 1, 2013 with maturities greater than one year. 
The CACs apply to all new issues, irrespective of the governing law. The provisions describe the 
majorities required to modify the payment terms for a single series of bonds (66.67 percent) as well as 
a cross-series modification (75 percent across all the series).4 In essence, the Euro CAC initiative 
engineered, in one blow, what was likely the single biggest change to sovereign bond contract terms 
ever (Gelpern and Gulati (2013)).5 
The Euro CAC initiative was intended to ensure private sector involvement in future sovereign 
restructurings by improving creditors’ coordination, and reduce the problem of holdout creditor 
litigation that frequently impacts sovereign restructurings (Gelpern and Gulati (2013)). However, it was 
unclear how the provision would play out given that the introduction of CACs could potentially worsen 
                                                 
4 See 2012 Linklaters, “EU publishes mandatory Collective Action Clause for use in eurozone sovereign bonds from 1 
January 2013”, May. 
5 In shaping the Euro CACs, Euro area policy makers borrowed from the US Treasury department initiative in the early 
2000s, which focused on emerging market countries issuing bonds to foreign investors under New York law. The Euro area 
version of the initiative, however, was more ambitious in three ways. The size was larger (it applied to a multi trillion dollar 
market as compared to one that was a few hundred billion), the scope was wider (applied via the local law of every Euro 
member nation as opposed to a single one, New York), and the CAC provisions in question were more powerful (applying 
in an aggregated fashion across a full set of a nation’s bonds, as opposed to on a bond by bond basis). 
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the “willingness-to-pay” problem of sovereigns. At the margin, after all, making it easier for a 
sovereign to restructure its debt might also make it more tempting to do so in a strategic manner even 
when the sovereign crisis is not acute enough to justify such action.6 
To test the impact of Euro CACs on bond yields, we first develop a simple model to illustrate the 
main ideas and predictions arising from the introduction of CACs. The framework borrows two key 
features from Bolton and Jeanne (2009). First, the sovereign is assumed to be subject to the classic 
“willingness to pay” problem as in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) so that it cannot credibly commit to 
repay creditors. Second, there can be selective default in that the sovereign can default selectively on 
creditors holding different types of bond contracts. This second feature helps us understand the Euro area 
context where there is a coexistence of CAC and no-CAC bonds. 
B. The model 
We develop a simple two-period (T=1,2) framework where a sovereign has one outstanding unit of 
no-CAC bonds and one of CAC bonds. Both bonds have to be repaid in period 2, but differ in terms of 
investors’ protection, as we explain below. The sovereign uses the funds raised to invest in a productive 
investment returning a stochastic output y at date 2, which is distributed according to the probability 
distribution function f(y) over [𝑦,𝑦]. The government maximizes output net of the repayments to 
bondholders.  
Lenders are risk neutral and require the same expected return, which is normalized to zero. There 
is perfect competition among lenders. so that the sovereign can extract all the surplus. We denote by Di 
the promised repayment on debt issued at date 1, where i = N, C indicates no-CAC and CAC bonds.  
Debt is repaid at date 2 when the output realizes. The sovereign debt market is perfectly 
competitive and the equilibrium riskless interest rate is normalized to zero, so that creditors make zero 
returns in expectation. The promise to repay DN + DC is credible only if it is in the sovereign’s interest 
to repay its debt obligations ex post. As typical in the sovereign debt literature, we assume that the 
sovereign repays only as a way to avoid the cost of default. This is modelled as being a proportional 
                                                 
6 As of this writing, in late 2018, policy makers in the Euro area are actively debating whether to enhance the effectiveness 
of the existing CACs in Euro area sovereign bonds, so as to further reduce the likelihood of holdout problems in future debt 
restructurings. Some EU members object that this reform, on the grounds that making it easier for sovereings to restructure, 
will raise their cost of borrowing at an inopportune moment (Zettelmeyer (2018)).  For example, in June 2018, the Director 
General of Italy’s Treasury Department called the proposal for enhanced CACs a “bombshell in the making”, arguing that 
“Italy is in a very fragile situation due to a very high public debt and these intiatives . . . produce enormous risk” (Guarascio 
(2018)). 
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output loss γiy with i=N,C, and can be interpreted as a sanction imposed by creditors on the defaulting 
sovereign (see, e.g., Bolton and Jeanne (2009)).  
Importantly, we consider that the default cost depends on the “size” of the default. As the 
sovereign borrows from different creditors, it can default selectively on the CAC and no-CAC bonds. 
As the no-CAC bonds require unanimity of consensus for any payment modification, they are more 
difficult to restructure than the CAC bonds requiring only a minimum vote threshold. For simplicity, 
we then consider that CAC bonds can be renegotiated at no cost, while the no-CAC bonds are not 
renegotiable so that no-CAC lenders obtain either 0 or the promised repayment. The sovereign has 
therefore the following options at date 2: 7 
a) Full default: pay 0 to both CAC or no-CAC lenders and incur the output loss (γN+γC)y so to 
obtain (1 - (γN + γC))y; 
b) Partial default: restructure CAC bonds in exchange for a return ηP, while pay 0 to no-CAC 
lenders, thus incurring the default costs γNy and obtaining (1-γN)y - ηP.  
c) Strategic default: restructure CAC bonds for a return ηS and repay the no-CAC lenders the 
promised repayment DN. In this case, there are no output losses and the sovereign obtains y-
ηS-DN.  
d) Full repayment: repay both types of lenders the promised repayment Di  and obtain y- DN – 
DC.  
The table below summarizes the payoffs of the different players. 
  
                                                 
7 One may ask whether these assumptions – typical in the analysis of the foreign law context – are justified here given that a 
sovereign has  control of the local law and can alter it for any bonds where there are too many holdouts. This is what is 
referred to as the “local law advantage” in the literature and was crucial to the Greek restructuring in 2012 and the Barbados 
restructuring in 2018 (Buchheit and Gulati (2018)). The key point is that this local law advantage has significant limitations 
on it, as a function of litigation costs and circumstances when it can be justfified as in the case of the Greek restructuring of 
2012 (Grund (2017)). Thus, for purposes of the model, we disregard the possibility of using the local law advantage (which 
would apply to both CAC and no-CAC bonds similarly). Rather, we focus on the fact that the likelihood of the sovereign 
behaving strategically will depend on the size of the parameter γi representing the constraints imposed by the domestic legal system.   
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 Sovereign CAC lenders no-CAC lenders 
No default y- DN – DC DC DN 
Strategic default y-ηS - DN ηS DN 
Partial default  (1 - γN)y - ηP ηP 0 
Full default  (1 - (γN + γC))y 0 0 
 
The table highlights the trade-off between CAC and no-CAC bonds. CAC bonds protect lenders in 
partial default, but they also expose them to the possibility of being restructured in a strategic default. 
By contrast, no-CAC bonds do not protect investors in partial default, but are not subject to 
restructuring in a strategic default.  
 
A. Repayment game  
 
The sovereign chooses the action at date 2 that maximizes its returns. Thus, the sovereign prefers 
partial default over full default if  
 
ሺ1 െ γ୒ሻy െ  η௉, ൒  ൫1 െ ሺγ୒ ൅ γେሻ൯𝑦 
that is for  
η௉ ൑ γେy. 
For simplicity, we consider that creditors obtain the surplus in the renegotiation phase and can thus 
set 
η௉ ൌ γେy . (1) 
Similarly, the sovereign prefers strategic default over partial (or full) default if  
𝑦 െ ηௌ െ 𝐷ே ൒ ሺ1 െ γ୒ሻy െ  η௉ ൌ ൫1 െ ሺγ୒ ൅ γେሻ൯𝑦, 
that is for 
ηௌ ൑ γ୒𝑦 ൅ η௉ െ 𝐷ே. 
 
(2) 
Substituting η௉ from (1) implies that strategic default is possible if 
γ୒𝑦 ൅ γେy ൒ 𝐷ே 
or if 
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y ൒ 𝐷ே𝑦ே ൅ γେ. 
Using again η௉ as in (1) and solving (2) with equality considering again that creditors have the full 
bargaining power, we then obtain  
ηௌ ൌ ሺγ୒ ൅ γେሻ𝑦 െ 𝐷ே. 
 
(3) 
Finally, the sovereign prefers full repayment over strategic (partial or full) default if  
𝑦 െ 𝐷ே – 𝐷஼ ൒ 𝑦 െ ηௌ െ 𝐷ே 
Substituting then ηௌ as in (2), full repayment is then preferred for  
𝑦 ൒. 𝐷ே ൅ 𝐷஼γ୒ ൅ γେ . 
We then obtain the following result characterizing the default ex post.  
Proposition 1: The sovereign’s debt repayment strategy is as follows: 
a. Full repayment: if 𝑦 ൒. ஽ಿା஽಴ஓొାஓి , the sovereign fully repays both types of debt.  
b. Strategic default: if  ஽ಿஓొାஓి ൑ 𝑦 ൏.
஽ಿା஽಴
ஓొାஓి , the sovereign fully repays the no-CAC bonds, while it 
restructures the CAC bonds in exchange for ηௌ.  
c. Partial default: if 𝑦 ൏ ஽ಿஓొାஓి, the sovereign defaults on the no-CAC bonds, while it restructures 
the CAC bonds in exchange for 𝜂௉. 
Proof: See the discussion above.  
This proposition highlights the importance of different contractual clauses for lenders’ repayment. 
For low levels of output, the CAC creditors are more protected than no-CAC bondholders as the latter 
cannot coordinate on a restructuring. For intermediate values of output though, the possibility for the 
sovereign to default strategically and restructure the CAC bonds hurts the CAC creditors relative to the 
no-CAC creditors that are instead repaid fully. Creditors anticipate the different treatment at date 2 
when pricing their debt at date 1. It follows that the difference between the promised repayments 
𝐷ே and 𝐷஼ on no-CAC and CAC bonds will depend on the likelihood of strategic default versus partial 
default. We turn to this next.  
B. Creditors’ repayments  
We can now turn to date 1 and analyze debt pricing. As the sovereign debt market is competitive at 
date 1, the sovereign extracts all surplus and sets the promised repayments on both bonds just to satisfy 
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creditors’ participation constraint. From Proposition 1, CAC creditors’ participation constraint is given 
by 
׬ η௉𝑓ሺ𝑦ሻ𝑑𝑦 ൅ ׬ ηௌ𝑓ሺ𝑦ሻ𝑑𝑦 ൅ ׬ D஼𝑓ሺ𝑦ሻ𝑑𝑦 ൒ 1௬ವಿశವ಴
ಋొశಋి
ವಿశವ಴
ಋొశಋి
ವಿ
ಋొశಋి
ವಿ
ಋొశಋి௬ . 
Substituting η௉ and ηௌ  from (1) and (2) above, the expression simplifies to  
׬ γେ𝑦𝑓ሺ𝑦ሻ𝑑𝑦 ൅ ׬ ሺሺγ୒ ൅ γେሻ𝑦 െ Dேሻ𝑓ሺ𝑦ሻ𝑑𝑦 ൅ ׬ D஼𝑓ሺ𝑦ሻ𝑑𝑦 ൒ 1௬ವಿశವ಴
ಋొశಋి
ವಿశವ಴
ಋొశಋి
ವಿ
ಋొశಋి
ವಿ
ಋొశಋి௬ ,     (4) 
where the terms represent, in order, the payoff in the case of partial default, strategic default and full 
repayment.  
Similarly, the participation constraint of no-CAC creditors is given by  
න Dே𝑓ሺ𝑦ሻ𝑑𝑦 ൒ 1
௬
஽ಿஓొାஓి
. 
 
(5) 
since they obtain nothing for 𝑦 ൏. ஽ಿஓొାஓి while they are fully repaid otherwise.  
It is immediate to see from (4) and (5) that the difference in the promised repayments (and thus in 
yields) between Dே and 𝐷஼ can be either positive or negative depending on the relative importance of 
the regions of partial and strategic default. In particular, the larger the partial default region and the 
lower the one of strategic default, the more 𝐷஼ will be likely smaller than 𝐷ே. The relative importance 
of the two regions depends in turn on the probability distribution 𝑓ሺ𝑦ሻ and the size of the default costs 
as represented by the parameters γ୒ and γେ. We have the following result. 
Proposition 2: The difference between the promised repayments|𝐷ே െ 𝐷஼| is larger i) the greater is 
the mass of the distribution probability f(y) in the interval [𝑦, ஽ಿஓొାஓి] relative to the mass in the interval 
[ ஽ಿஓొାஓి ,
஽ಿା஽಴
ஓొାஓి ]; ii) the larger are the parameters γ୒ and γେ as, for given f(y), the size of the strategic 
default region decreases with them: 𝜕 ቂ஽ಿା஽಴ஓొାஓి െ
஽ಿ
ஓొାஓిቃ / 𝜕γ୧=െ
஽಴
ሺஓొାஓిሻమ. 
C. Empirical predictions  
We can use Proposition 2 to generate two main empirical predictions. First, the shape of the 
distribution f(y) can be approximated by the rating of a country. In particular, worse ratings correspond 
to more skewed left distributions than better ratings. Second, the parameter γେ  can be seen as a 
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measure of the quality of law of a country. As explained above, the parameter γ୧  represents the 
proportion of output lost in a default. This in turn can be interpreted as a sanction imposed by creditors. 
Thus, it is plausible to consider it an increasing function of the quality of the legal system as better laws 
and courts will provide better protection to investors against expropriation by the state. In line with 
these arguments, we expect the spread between CAC and no-CAC bonds will vary across Euro area 
countries as follows:  
1) the yield differential between the no-CAC and the CAC bonds as represented by the 
difference |𝐷ே െ 𝐷஼| is decreasing in the sovereign’s rating; 
2) the yield differential between the no-CAC and the CAC bonds as represented by the 
difference |𝐷ே െ 𝐷஼| is increasing in the quality of law of the sovereign.  
II. Dataset Description 
In our analyses we will make use of two samples of bonds: bonds with CAC provisions issued after 
January 1, 2013 (“CAC bonds”), and bonds without CAC provisions issued before January 1, 2013 that 
have similar characteristics to CAC bonds (“Matched no-CAC bonds”). Our primary source of 
information is Bloomberg. 
CAC bonds are selected according to the following criteria: issued by national governments 
belonging to the Eurozone as of January 2013 (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia 
and Spain); denominated in Euro; with issuance between January 1, 2013 and June 30, 2014; with 
maturity (at issuance) between 1 and 30 years; with strictly positive amount issued; being either zero 
coupon or having a fixed coupon; noncallable, nonputtable, nonsinking fund, nonconvertible and not 
inflation linked. At this stage we select 106 bonds issued by 15 Eurozone countries.8 Despite the 
inclusion of CACs in bonds issued after January 1, 2013 is mandatory, we check that bonds are flagged 
by Bloomberg as including CACs. For cautioness, we then drop four bonds (three issued by Belgium 
and one from Malta) for which this data field is missing. We finally resort to Bloomberg, Dealogic and 
Thomson One to identify the governing law of these bonds, and supplement information from these 
                                                 
8 There are no bond issuances that meet our criteria for Estonia, while Greece issued only short term bonds, i.e., with 
maturities less than a year, during our sample period. 
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sources with hand-collected data. We are able to find the governing law of 93 bonds issued by 14 
Eurozone countries,9 out of which we identify 89 as domestic-law bonds. 
To build the sample of matched no-CAC bonds we first identify in Bloomberg the pool of bonds 
using criteria similar to the ones described above, with the sole exception that we now consider bonds 
issued before January 1, 2013 that mature after that date. We then retrieve the governing law of these 
bonds using the three datasets mentioned above. Again we check that bonds issued under local law are 
not flagged by Bloomberg as having CAC provisions. We perform a matching (without replacement) 
for each CAC bond with one bond in this pool conditioning on same issuer and same currency, and 
select the bond with the closest maturity date to that of the CAC bond we consider. For example, we 
match the 10YR Euro-denominated 1.75 percent German CAC bond issued on January 31, 2014 (with 
an International Securities Identification Number equal to DE0001102333, maturity February 15, 2024) 
with the 30YR Euro-denominated 6.25 percent German no-CAC bond issued on January 4, 1994 (ISIN 
DE0001134922, maturity January 4, 2024). Our matching procedure enables us to form 83 pairs of 
CAC and matched no-CAC bonds issued by 13 countries.10 
Table 1 provides the country breakdown at each stage of our data construction procedure. The 
country split for CAC issuances is in line with that observed for Euro-denominated long-term bonds in 
previous periods,11 where Belgium, France, Italy and Spain account for more than 50 percent of 
issuances. In economic terms, the largest issuers are France, Germany, Italy and Spain, which represent 
about 80 percent of the total outstanding amount of CAC bonds by the end of 2014. The country 
breakdown we uncover using CAC bonds’ outstanding amount (see the last column in Table 1) is in 
line with that one obtains using central government long-term debt securities during the last quarter of 
2014. 12 
Figure 1 displays the issuance activity (amount at issuance as well as the number of issuances) of 
CAC bonds between January 2013 and June 2014. Within six months from the inception of the Euro 
                                                 
9 We drop bonds issued by Malta because we cannot retrieve their governing law. 
10 The matching procedure drops all CAC bonds issued by Cyprus since before 2013 Cyprus issued bonds under English 
law only. We further discard the 15YR 2.25 percent bond issued by Luxemburg on March 13, 2013 (ISIN LU0905090048) 
because the only bond we could match it with has a very different maturity (ISIN XS0506445963, maturity date May 18, 
2020). 
11 We have identified new issuances of Euro-denominated bonds with zero or fixed coupon and maturity at issuance 
between 1 and 30 years between January 1, 2009 and June 30, 2010, and get country breakdowns that are similar to those 
documented in Table 1 for our CAC bonds. 
12 The matching procedure drops all CAC bonds issued by Cyprus since before 2013 Cyprus issued bonds under English 
law only. We further discard the 15YR 2.25 percent bond issued by Luxemburg on March 13, 2013 (ISIN LU0905090048) 
because the only bond we could match it with has a very different maturity (ISIN XS0506445963, maturity date May 18, 
2020). 
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CAC initiative, all countries but Luxembourg had issued at least one bond with CACs. Figure 2 plots 
the time-series of the amount outstanding (sum of amount at issuance and reopenings) of CAC bonds,13 
both in absolute terms and relative to the overall amount of long-term government debt. Figure 2 
reveals that by the end of June 2014 about 13 percent of long-term bonds included the new Euro CAC 
provision.14 The joint message of Figures 1 and 2 is that CAC bonds have gained importance, over 
time, in the context of Eurozone sovereign debt markets. 
For these CAC bonds we collect from Bloomberg daily mid-yields, prices (mid, ask and bid), 
amount outstanding and volume,15 between January 1, 2013 (or the issue date, for bonds issued later 
than January 1, 2013) and December 30, 2014 (or the maturity date, for bonds maturing before 
December 30, 2014). For the sample of matched no-CAC bonds we collect the same variables between 
January 1, 2013 and December 30, 2014 (or the maturity date). We compute Macaulay duration, 
convexity, and percentage bid-ask spreads from daily prices. We create the variable 𝐷𝑢𝑟௜,௖,௧ ൌ
𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑟௜,௖,௧ െ 0.5 ൈ ஼௢௡௩೔,೎,೟ଵ଴଴  which corrects Macaulay duration by bond convexity.16 To reduce 
the measurement error that may contaminate daily data, we carry out our analyses at the weekly level 
and derive weekly variables as simple averages of daily values, dropping weeks with negative or zero 
yields. 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of bond-level variables for the CAC and the matched no-CAC 
samples. Here, we consider only those weeks where both the CAC bond and the matched no-CAC bond 
have available bond-level information. To illustrate, we include the 30YR Euro-denominated 6.25 
percent German no-CAC bond issued on January 4, 1994 from the fifth week of 2014 onwards. This 
ensures that our panel dataset has the same number of weekly observations for CAC and matched no-
CAC bonds. On average, CAC bonds have higher duration, smaller amount outstanding and turnover, 
and lower bid-ask spreads, while their maturities do not differ from those of matched no-CAC bonds. 
Figure 3 plots the histogram of the absolute distance (in months) between maturities in the two 
                                                 
13 After issuing a new bond, governments can raise additional debt by reopening already existing securities. Reopenings are 
indeed quite common: during our sample period, 70 (out of 83) bonds have been reopened and, at the end of June 2014, they 
represent about 60 percent of the aggregate outstanding amount of CAC bonds. 
14 For each country, we define long-term government debt as the sum of general government long-term residual maturities 
(over 1 year) and short-term residual maturities (up to 1 year), in all currencies (source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse). 
15 Bloomberg contains volume data separately for each exchange where a bond is listed. On average, bonds in our sample 
are listed on four exchanges, with considerable variation across countries – mean values range from 1.33 exchanges for 
Slovenian bonds to 9.1 exchanges for German bonds. Turnover is defined as total traded volume (i.e., aggregated across all 
exchanges) scaled by amount outstanding. 
16 In principle, we could include convexity as an additional measure of bond risk. However, in our sample, Macaulay 
duration and convexity are highly collinear (the linear correlation equals 0.934). We therefore opt for an alternative measure 
of bond price risk – which we label simply as “duration”. Our results are unchanged when using Macaulay duration alone. 
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samples. For 50 bond pairs (representing about 60 percent of our sample) the difference in maturities is 
less than 6 months, and for 69 pairs (representing more than 80 percent of our sample) it is less than 
one year. 
III. CAC Provisions and Yield Differentials 
We start by investigating the impact of CAC provisions on bond yields. To this end, we compare the 
yields of CAC bonds with those of matched no-CAC bonds. Our empirical strategy is to estimate the 
following random-effects model: 
                      
𝑦௜,௖,௧ ൌ 𝛼 ൅ 𝛽𝐶𝐴𝐶௜ ൅ 𝛾𝑋௜,௖,௧ ൅ 𝜃௜ ൅ 𝜀௜,௖,௧ (1) 
 
where 𝜃௜ is a bond-level random component, 𝑦௜,௖,௧ is the log of the mid-yield (in percent) for bond i 
(issued by country c) during week t,17 𝐶𝐴𝐶௜ is our main variable of interest (an indicator equal to one 
for a CAC bond and zero for a matched no-CAC bond), and 𝑋௜,௖,௧ is a vector of control variables. The 
vector 𝑋௜,௖,௧ includes time (i.e., week) fixed effects that capture co-movement in Eurozone yields, and 
bond- as well as country-specific variables (definitions of the explanatory variables are collected in 
Table A1 in Appendix). 
We map country Standard & Poor’s long-term issuer credit ratings (observed on Fridays) to a 
numeric scale and proxy country creditworthiness by means of 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔௖,௧. Higher values of 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔௖,௧ 
indicate worse credit ratings: during our sample period, this variable ranges from 1 (AAA rating) to 12 
(BB rating). Although we have matched CAC to no-CAC bonds along a number of dimensions (i.e., 
issuer, currency, law, and residual maturity), other bond-level characteristics impinge on risk and, in 
turn, on yields. As a proxy for bond interest rate risk we include duration (𝐷𝑢𝑟௜,௖,௧), which is affected, 
among others, by the coupon structure (rate and frequency of payment). Moreover, since by 
construction matched no-CAC bonds are off-the-run while CAC bonds are on-the-run,18 we control for 
liquidity risk by means of bond 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒௜,௖,௧, i.e., the log of outstanding amount (in Euro mln), bid-ask 
spread (in percent), 𝐵𝐴𝑆௜,௖,௧, and turnover (exchange-traded volume scaled by amount outstanding). 
Note that bond size is usually time-varying, at the bond level, due to reopenings. 
                                                 
17 We take the logarithm of the bond yields to mitigate the effect of potential outliers. However, results in our main analysis 
are unaffected if we use yields (in level). 
18 The positive yield differential between off- and on-the-run treasuries is well documented for the US market (e.g., Warga 
(1992); and Pasquariello and Vega (2009)), while we are unaware of similar studies for European sovereigns. 
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The research question we are after motivates our choice to use unit-specific (i.e. bond) random 
effects, as opposed to fixed effects: our variable of interest – the inclusion of CAC provisions – is 
multicollinear with bond fixed effects. Bae and Vidhan (2009) offer similar considerations when 
examining the relation between legal protection and bank loan characteristics in 48 countries: since 
their variables of interest – creditor and property rights indexes – show little within-unit (i.e. country) 
variation, they opt for random effects instead of fixed effects which “soak up some of the explanatory 
power of these slowly changing variables” (Bae and Vidhan (2009), p. 839). Random effects therefore 
emerge as a (partial) remedy to omitted variables, at least those that are uncorrelated with our 
covariates. As an alternative to the random-effects estimation, we use pooled OLS after replacing the 
bond random components 𝜃௜ in specification (1) with bond-pair fixed effects. Also in this case we can 
come up with an estimate for the coefficient of interest, 𝛽, which is robust to omitted variables – 
although at a higher level of aggregation – correlated with our covariates. We will return to the issue of 
bond-level omitted variables in Section V as well. 
Table 3 reports random-effects (RE) and pooled OLS estimation results for several specifications. 
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the level of the matched bonds in the sample.19 Columns 1 
and 3 in Table 3 refer to the baseline specification (1) and highlight that yields increase with bond-level 
interest rate risk, while liquidity risk measures are overall insignificant. This lack of significance is not 
surprising in light of the mixed evidence on the role of liquidity for Euro area government bonds: 
Favero, Pagano and von Thadden (2010) for example find that liquidity differentials are priced only for 
a subset of EMU countries, while Beber, Brandt and Kavajecz (2009) show that liquidity matters only 
in times of economic distress. Random-effects estimation results futher establish that bond yields are 
inversely related to the issuer creditworthiness, while country ratings are not significant in column 3 – 
this happens because ratings show relatively little within-country variation during our sample period 
and bond-pair fixed effects absorb time-invariant country characteristics. 
Turning to our main variable of interest, CAC provisions negatively affect bond yields: our 
estimates indicate that yields on CAC bonds are, on average, about 8-10 percent lower than those of 
matched no-CAC bonds, i.e., 8.06 percent ൌ 1 െ exp ሺെ0.084ሻ and 10.6 percent ൌ 1 െ exp ሺെ0.112ሻ 
and; or equivalently they are lower by 13-17 bps. 
                                                 
19 Clustering at the country level (which spans bonds level clustering, see e.g., Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2011)) leaves 
our main findings unaffected. 
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The baseline specification is pooled across all issuers, so that all our control variables (as well as the 
constant term) are estimated across countries. Thus, one potential concern is whether cross-country 
heterogeneity affects our findings. This concern may apply both to bond-specific characteristics as well 
as variables that are common to all Eurozone countries – captured by the week fixed effects. For 
instance, there is evidence that bond-level liquidity risk differs across the maturity spectrum (Beber, 
Brandt and Kavajecz (2009)). Moreover, the empirical evidence on the ECB (unconventional) 
monetary policy is suggestive that yields on sovereign bonds issued by different countries react 
differently to these interventions, while the response of the yield curve to ECB (conventional) 
monetary policy is quite homogeneous across countries.20 
To address these concerns, we consider a saturated model that includes the interactions between 
country fixed effects and bond-level variables (52=13×4 interactions) as well as the interactions 
between country and time fixed effects (1,339=13×103 interactions). 21  This saturated model, in 
essence, maintains only one panel restriction, i.e., the CAC indicator. Columns 2 and 4 in Table 3 
report regression results for the saturated model. Yields continue to be negatively associated with CAC 
provisions, although both the economic magnitude and the statistical significance of this effect are 
lower than those documented for the baseline specification: point estimates in column 2 (resp. 4) would 
translate into a 8 bps (resp., 15 bps) yield wedge between CAC and matched no-CAC bonds. 
The data-pooling used in panel estimation may mask a time-varying response of bond yields to CAC 
provisions. To address this issue, we perform OLS cross-sectional regressions for each week. The 
equation estimated at each time t is the same as in specification (1), dropping the bond random 
components 𝜃௜ and the time fixed effects. We start our analysis from the last week of February 2013 
because we have at least 30 observations (15 CAC and 15 matched no-CAC bonds) from then onwards. 
The adjusted R-squared ranges between 0.62 and 0.94, with an average value of 0.79. The point 
estimates for the coefficient on the CAC indicator are plotted in Figure 4 (solid blue line) together with 
their 99 percent confidence intervals (shaded grey area). As the figure reveals, we can exclude that 
yields between CAC and no-CAC bonds are identical for a substantial number of cross-sections (67 out 
                                                 
20 The implementation of the ECB Securities Markets Programme (SMP) has successfully driven down yields of the 
countries under the programme, with reductions ranging from -1 to -2bps (Italy) up to -17 to -21bps (Greece) per €1 bln of 
bond purchases (Eser and Schwaab (2016); Ghysels, Idier, Manganelli and Vergote (2016)). Altavilla, Giannone and Lenza 
(2016) document that the ECB Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) announcements lowered bond yields in Italy and 
Spain while leaving yields on French and German bonds largely unaffected. The same authors find that a tightening in the 
stance of euro-area-wide (conventional) monetary policy exerts fairly homogeneous effects on yield curves across countries. 
21 We do not include country fixed effects as well as their interactions with country risk as these are collinear with the 
(country × week) interactions. 
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of 96 weeks). Overall, the yield differential between CAC and matched no-CAC bonds is persistently 
negative and statistically significant throughout the sample period. 
IV. Country heterogeneity 
We now shed light on how the yield differential varies across countries by interacting the CAC 
indicator in specification (1) with country fixed effects. Panel A in Table 4 reports random-effects 
estimation results (see column 1). This specification produces, for each country, estimates for average 
(log-)yields on CAC and matched no-CAC bonds – after controlling for country- and bond-level 
covariates and the time fixed effects. Instead of reporting these coefficients (26 in total), we show in 
Panel B, for each country indicated by ISO-Alpha 2 country code, the difference between these 
coefficients – what we label as the “net impact of CAC provisions” – together with its standard error 
(in brackets), and the percentage of bond-week observations in a given country (in square brackets). 
According to Panel B, there is no country where CAC bonds trade at significantly higher yields than 
matched no-CAC bonds. In light of the model, the result suggests that there is a low likelihood of 
strategic in our countries of interest relative to partial default, so that no-CAC bonds have higher yields. 
For a subset of countries, CAC provisions negatively affect bond yields in six countries that represent 
about 40% of the sample: estimates indicate that yields on CAC bonds are, on average, about 8 percent 
(Italy) to 22 percent (Portugal) lower than those of matched no-CAC bonds. We now turn to 
disentangle the effect of CAC provisions according to the two variables that the model highlights as 
important drivers of the CAC and no-CAC yields (see Section I.B): issuer creditworthiness and quality 
of the legal system. 
A. CAC Provisions and Creditworthiness 
First, we investigate how the CAC vs. no-CAC yield differential changes across the credit ratings 
spectrum.22 To this end we add to specification (1) the interaction between the CAC indicator and 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔௖,௧, and estimate: 
                       
𝑦௜,௖,௧ ൌ 𝛼 ൅ 𝛽଴𝐶𝐴𝐶௜ ൅ 𝛽ଵ𝐶𝐴𝐶௜ ൈ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔௖,௧ ൅ 𝛾𝑋௜,௖,௧ ൅ 𝜃௜ ൅ 𝜀௜,௖,௧ (2) 
 
                                                 
22 The existing empirical literature (e.g., Bardozzetti and Dottori (2014) and Bradley and Gulati (2014), and references cited 
therein), has dealt with the effect of CAC provisions in countries with different creditworhtiness, however reaching mixed 
results.. 
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It is worth mentioning that the coefficients on the constitutive terms 𝐶𝐴𝐶௜  and 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔௖,௧  in the 
multiplicative model (2) cannot be interpreted as unconditional or average effects. We therefore follow  
Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) in making inference from our interaction model.23 What we are 
interested in is the net impact of CAC provisions, which, according to specification (2) is 
  
𝛽଴ ൅ 𝛽ଵ𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔௖,௧ 
 
The coefficient 𝛽଴ would therefore be informative of the marginal effect of CACs for the unique case 
when in which 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔௖,௧ ൌ 0 – a case we never observe since the we code the best rating, AAA, as 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔௖,௧ ൌ 1  and  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔௖,௧  increases with worse credit quality.24  What is more, it is perfectly 
possible for the marginal effect of CACs to be significant for a meaningful range of country ratings 
even if the coefficient 𝛽ଵ is insignificant (see Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006), p. 74). We therefore 
complement regression results for specification (2) in Table 4 (see Panel A, second column) with the 
marginal effect of CACs across the country ratings spectrum we observe in our sample (see Panel B). 
Similar to our findings in Table 3, yields increase with interest rate risk, and those of matched no-CAC 
bonds get larger with worse credit ratings. The net impact of CACs is always negative, and its 
magnitude as well as statistical significance increases as issuer creditworthiness deteriorates: the 
marginal effect of CAC provisions is significant at the 1% level for countries with AA rating or worse 
(about 75% of bond-week observations), where it ranges from 6.5% (rating AA) to 11.5% (rating BB). 
Overall, these findings support the prediction that the yield differential between CAC and no-CAC 
bonds is larger for issuers with worse credit quality. 
B. CAC Provisions and Quality of Law 
We now analyze how the yield differential associated with CAC provisions depends on the strength 
of the legal system. We first screen the empirical literature on legal protection and financial outcomes 
(most notably, Bae and Vidhan (2009) and Karolyi (2015), and the references therein) to identify the 
proxies for a country’s quality of law. We select six indicators: the formalism index (Djankov, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003); abbreviated as DLLS), the judicial efficiency index (La 
                                                 
23 Finance applications include Georgarakos and Pasini (2011) for the effect of trust and sociability on stock ownership and  
Carrieri, Chaieb and Errunza (2013) for the effect of openness and implicit barriers on globalization. 
24 Similarly, the coefficient on country ratings would be revealing of the impact of issuer creditworthiness on (log-)yields of 
matched no-CAC bonds only. 
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Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998); LLSV(EJ)), the property rights index (Heritage 
Foundation; Heritage), the law and order index (PRS Group/ICRG Political Risk Rating; PRS), and 
two rule of law indexes (LLSV(RL) and World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicator, abbreviated as 
World Bank). These indicators are broadly related to the quality of law, both in terms of the law on-the-
books and law enforcement.25 In light of the model of Section I.B, we view these as proxies for the 
parameter – larger values for  are associated with better legal systems. In order to empirically 
investigate the effect of a country’s quality of law on bond yields we add to specification (1) 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑤௖,௧ and its interaction with the CAC indicator, and estimate: 
 
𝑦௜,௖,௧ ൌ 𝛼 ൅ 𝛽଴𝐶𝐴𝐶௜ ൅ 𝛽ଵ𝐶𝐴𝐶௜ ൈ 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑤௖,௧ ൅ 𝛾𝑋௜,௖,௧ ൅ 𝜃௜ ൅ 𝜀௜,௖,௧ (3) 
 
where the vector of covariates 𝑋௜,௖,௧  includes 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑤௖,௧  on top of all the variables used in 
specification (1) – week fixed effects, country ratings, and bond-level variables. Regressions results are 
reported in columns 3-8 in Table 4-Panel A, separately for each quality of law measure. We confirm 
previous findings that bond yields are positively associated with duration – our proxy for interest rate 
risk –, and, overall, negatively associated with the issuer creditworthiness. Columns 3-5 further offer 
some evidence that bond yields decrease with bond size, consistent with the idea that liquidity risk is 
priced.26 According to specification (3), the net impact of CAC provisions is given by: 
 
𝛽଴ ൅ 𝛽ଵ𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑤௖,௧ 
 
                                                 
25 Some of these indicators – DLLS, LLSV(EJ) and LLSV(RL) – are, by construction, purely cross-sectional since they are 
observed only once, while the others are, at least in principle, time-varying. During our sample period, however, only the 
World Bank Rule of Law index shows some (little) variation, at the country level, over time. With the sole exception of 
DLLS, which ranges from good to bad, all indicators assign larger values to countries with better quality of law. DLLS and 
the LLSV indicators are not available for some countries in our sample – see Panel B in Table A1 for further details. 
26  As noted in Subsection IV.A, the coefficient 𝛽଴  is informative of the marginal effect of CACs in a country with 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑤௖,௧ ൌ 0, a case we never observe in our sample. For the proxies in columns 4-7 a value of 0 would indicate a 
with a country with extremely low quality of law, which is not observed even in the entire sample of countries for which 
these proxies are available: the lowest value for LLSV(EJ) is 2.5 (Indonesia), for LLSV(RL) is 1.9 (Sri Lanka), for PRS is 
0.83 (Somalia), and for Heritage is 0.5 (North Korea, Turkmenistan and Venezuela). The rule of law index form the World 
Bank takes a value very close to zero for Montenegro (0.007), and reaches its lowest value at -2.45 (Somalia). On the 
contrary, since DLLS ranges from good to bad a value of 0 would indicate a country with extremely high quality of law –
according to Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003) the best country is Hong Kong with a formalism 
index of 0.73. 
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which we report in Table 4-Panel B for the values of the quality of law indicator(s) that we observe in 
our sample. 27  Number is square brackets refer to the percentage of the sample (bond-week 
observations) that falls into each value. According to the DLLS formalism index, these marginal effects 
are significantly negative at the 1% level for more than 85% of our sample – with  the sole exception of 
the effect associated to the largest value of 5.25 (Spain) which is insignificant – and increase from left 
to right. Since DLLS sorts countries from good to bad, this evidence is consistent with a negative yield 
differential associated to CAC provisions that widens with the quality of the legal system. Different 
from DLLS, the other five indicators assign larger values to better quality of law countries. The 
marginal effects in Panel B associated to each of these indicators are always negative and decrease 
from left to right. These marginal effects are all significant at the 1% level, with the exception of 
countries with relatively worse quality of law that are significant at the 5% level.  
In sum, the evidence on the interplay between CAC provisions and the quality of law is consistent with 
the idea that the incentives to strategically default are weaker in countries with better legal systems.  
V. Further results: Falsification exercise  
One potential concern with the evidence cumulated so far is omitted variables at the bond-level that 
are correlated with both CAC provisions and bond yields. To check for the possibility that the 
relationship between CACs and yields is spurious, we conduct a falsification exercise assuming 
(wrongly) that the Euro CAC initiative took place on January 1, 2011. Making use of the same filtering 
criteria detailed in Section II, we identify a placebo sample consisting of 73 bonds issued between 
January 1, 2011 and June 30, 2012 (“pseudo CAC bonds”), which we match with closest-maturity 
bonds issued prior to January 1, 2011 (“pseudo no-CAC bonds”).28 We then replicate our analyses 
using this placebo sample. In Table 5 we report random-effects estimation results for: 1) our baseline 
specification (1) (see column 1), and, 2) the saturated model that retains the pseudo CAC indicator as 
the sole panel restriction while interacting all other variables with country fixed effects (see column 2). 
Column 1 corroborates the evidence that bond yields are positively associated with bond-level interest 
rate risk and country credit risk (see Table 3-Column 1). Additionally, it suggests that liquidity risk is 
priced in bond yields: larger bonds and those with smaller bid-ask spreads have lower yields, while it is 
                                                 
27 For the World Bank rule of law index we report marginal effects evaluated at the 2013 values. 
28 The matching quality (in terms of residual maturities) is fairly similar to the one of CAC and matched no-CAC bonds: 
about 60% of bond pairs (42 out of 73) have residual maturities within 6 months, and about 75% (56 out of 73) within one 
year. Residual maturities are not statistically different between the two groups of bonds. 
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worth recalling that these variables were overall insignificant so far. These findings are contradictory 
only at a first sight: they are indeed consistent with the evidence in Beber, Brandt and Kavajecz (2009) 
that liquidity matters only during times of heightened uncertainty – and there is little doubt that 
sovereign debt markets were in turmoil during the years 2011-12. Importantly, neither column in Table 
5 certifies significant changes in yields associated with the pseudo CAC indicator. We then perform 
OLS cross-sectional regressions of specification (1) dropping the bond random components 𝜃௜ and the 
time fixed effects for each week from April 4, 2011 – the first week for which we have 15 bond pairs  –  
to December 28, 2012. Figure 5 depicts the point estimates for the coefficient on the pseudo CAC 
indicator (solid blue line) together with their 99 percent confidence intervals (shaded grey area). As the 
figure reveals, we never reject the hypothesis that yields are identical between pseudo CAC bonds and 
their matched counterparts. Finally, we make use of cross-country variation in creditworthiness and the 
quality of the legal system to estimate specifications (2) and (3) after replacing 𝐶𝐴𝐶௜ with the pseudo 
CAC indicator. Random-effects estimation results are reported in Panel A of Table 6, while Panel B 
shows the marginal effects of pseudo CAC provisions. Contrary to our findings based on the sample of 
CAC and matched no-CAC bonds (see Table 4), we fail, overall, to detect significant differences in 
yields between the two groups of bonds both across the ratings spectrum and the deck of the quality of 
the legal system measures. We conclude that systematic differences between recently issued bonds and 
older bonds are not confounding the reduction in bond yields associated with CAC provisions that we 
have documented in Sections III and IV. 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper exploits the Euro Collective Action Clause (CAC) initiative of 2013 to obtain results on a 
basic question in law and finance: are the non-financial contract terms of a bond priced? We ask that 
question in an arena where it has not been systematically investigated prior to this: the context of local-
law governed sovereign bonds. We find that investors are willing to pay a premium for CAC bonds in 
the Euro area relative to non-CAC bonds, and so in countries with worse ratings and more credible 
legal systems. 
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Monthly time series of CAC bonds new issuances by aggregate amount (blue bars, left vertical axis) and
by number of issuances (red squares, right vertical axis). CAC bonds are identified as Euro-denominated
zero-coupon or fixed coupon bonds issued under local law by 13 Eurozone countries between January 1,
2013 and June 30, 2014 and with maturity (at issuance) between 1 and 30 years.
Figure 1
CAC bonds issuances
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Monthly time series of CAC bonds outstanding by aggregate amount (bars, left vertical axis) and by
fraction of total long-term government debt outstanding (red squares, right vertical axis). Amount
outstanding is split between amount issued (red bars) and amount reopened (blue bars). CAC bonds are
identified as Euro-denominated zero-coupon or fixed coupon bonds issued under local law by 13
Eurozone countries between January 1, 2013 and June 30, 2014 and with maturity (at issuance) between
1 and 30 years.
Figure 2
CAC bonds outstanding
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Histogram of the distance (in absolute value) between CAC and matched no-CAC bonds, expressed in months.
CAC bonds are identified as Euro-denominated zero-coupon or fixed coupon bonds issued under local law by
13 Eurozone countries between January 1, 2013 and June 30, 2014 and with maturity (at issuance) between 1
and 30 years. Matched no-CAC bonds are issued before January 1, 2013 and have maturities as close as
possible to those of CAC bonds.
Figure 3
Maturity differential between CAC and matched non-CAC bonds
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FIGURE 4. CAC PROVISIONS AND YIELD DIFFERENTIALS, OVER TIME
Point estimates (solid blue line) together with their 99 percent confidence intervals (shaded grey area) of the
effect of CAC provisions on yields. The sample ranges from February 25, 2013 to December 30, 2014 and
includes 83 bonds issued after January 1, 2013 (CAC bonds) and 83 bonds issued before January 1, 2013
(matched no-CAC bonds). Point estimates are for the CAC indicator from cross-sectional regressions of weekly
log-yields on country rating and a series of bond-level controls (duration, size, bid-ask spread, and turnover).
Definitions of the explanatory variables are provided in Table A1.
CAC provisions and yield differentials, over time
Figure 4
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FIGURE 5. PSEUDO CAC PROVISIONS AND YIELD DIFFERENTIALS, OVER TIME
Point estimates (solid blue line) together with their 99 percent confidence intervals (shaded grey area) of the
effect of Pseudo CAC provisions on yields. The sample ranges from April 4, 2011 to December 28, 2012 and
includes 73 bonds issued after January 1, 2011 (Pseudo CAC bonds) and 73 bonds issued before January 1,
2011 (matched Pseudo no-CAC bonds). Point estimates are for the Pseudo CAC indicator from cross-sectional
regressions of weekly log-yields on country rating and a series of bond-level controls (duration, size, bid-ask
spread, and turnover). Definitions of the explanatory variables are provided in Table A1.
Pseudo CAC provisions and yield differentials, over time (placebo)
Figure 5
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Issuer Initial CAC provisions Local law CAC & Matched no-CAC Amount (€ bln)
Austria 4 4 4 4 27.35
Belgium 16 13 13 13 47.65
Cyprus 7 7 5 - -
Finland 3 3 3 3 15
France 10 10 10 10 220.57
Germany 5 5 5 5 90
Ireland 2 2 2 2 13.62
Italy 18 18 18 18 297.57
Luxembourg 2 2 2 1 2
Malta 10 9 - - -
the Netherlands 5 5 5 5 76.46
Portugal 6 6 5 5 12.43
Slovakia 4 4 4 4 7.94
Slovenia 4 4 3 3 3.14
Spain 10 10 10 10 179.76
Total 106 102 89 83 993.49
This table describes the country breakdown of bonds at each stage of our data construction process. “Initial” refers to Euro-
denominated zero-coupon or fixed coupon bonds issued by national governments in the Eurozone between January 1, 2013 and
June 30, 2014 and with maturity (at issuance) between 1 and 30 years. The remaining columns describe country
representativeness after each filter: “CAC provisions” requires bonds to be flagged by Bloomberg as including CACs; “Local
law” requires bonds to be local-law bonds; “CAC & Matched no-CAC” requires availability of a comparable no-CAC bond.
Amount outstanding refers to CAC bonds and is measured at the end of 2014.
Table 1
Data filtering and country representativeness
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Variable (unit) Difference
Mean Median 5th Pct. 95th Pct. Mean Median 5th Pct. 95th Pct.
Yield (%) 1.65 1.45 0.207 3.995 1.669 1.419 0.206 4.034 0.020
Duration 5.852 6.275 0.969 11.184 5.546 5.684 0.99 10.399 -0.305***
Amount (€mln) 9,801.3 9,126.3 5.7 21,185.8 13,092.1 13,598.3 22.3 28,068.4 3,290.8***
Bid-Ask spread (%) 0.138 0.045 0.013 0.649 0.160 0.049 0.014 0.837 0.022***
Turnover (%) 0.712 0.026 0.000 1.902 0.948 0.006 0.000 2.775 0.237**
Maturity (yrs) 7.644 7.545 1.496 15.789 7.661 7.323 2.003 15.493 0.017
CAC bonds (N=5,476) Matched no-CAC bonds (N=5,476)
This table presents means, medians, 5th and 95th percentiles for our samples of CAC and matched no-CAC bonds. Matched no-CAC bonds have maturities as close as possible to those of
CAC bonds. Maturity for CAC bonds is computed at issuance, i.e., the difference between maturity and issue date; for matched no-CAC bonds it is computed as the difference between
maturity date and the issuance date of the CAC bond with which the bond is matched. The time period ranges between January 1, 2013 and December 30, 2014. Descriptive statistics for
maturity are computed in the cross-section (83 bonds in each sample); for other variables these are computed in the panel (5,476 bond-week observations in each sample). The last column
reports the difference in means between matched no-CAC and CAC bonds together with the t-test statistical significance. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5
percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Sample overview CAC and no-CAC bonds (bond-level variables)
Table 2
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dependent variable: weekly log-yields
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAC -0.084*** -0.053††  -0.112*** -0.098***
(0.017) (0.028) (0.024) (0.027)
Duration 0.261*** × 0.360*** ×
(0.021) (0.049)
Size -0.026 × -0.014 ×
(0.016) (0.010)
Bid-Ask spread -0.002 × 0.048 ×
(0.110) (0.079)
Turnover -0.007 × -0.021 ×
(0.037) (0.039)
Rating 0.129*** -0.028
(0.014) (0.074)
Bond-level Random Effects Yes Yes No No
Matched bond-level Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Week Fixed Effects Yes - Yes -
Country Fixed Effects x (Bond characteristics) No Yes (×) No Yes (×)
Country x Week Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 10,952 10,952 10,952 10,952
Bonds 166 166 166 166
Adjusted R-squared 0.756 0.882 0.883 0.923
Pooled Ordinary Least SquaresRandom Effects
This table presents bond-level random effects (columns 1-2) and pooled ordinary least squares (columns 3-4) regression
results to examine the relation between CAC provisions and bond yields. The sample ranges from January 1, 2013 to
December 30, 2014 and includes 83 bonds issued after January 1, 2013 (CAC bonds) and 83 bonds issued before January 1,
2013 (matched no-CAC bonds). Definitions of the explanatory variables are provided in Table A1. Bond characteristics
interacted with country fixed effects in columns 2 and 4 are indicated with ×. Rating is not included in columns 2 and 4
because it is subsumed by the interactions between county and week fixed effects. Effects are either included ("Yes"), not
included ("No") or subsumed by other sets of effects ("-"). The table reports the estimated coefficients and below in
parentheses the standard errors that are adjusted for clustering at the matched bonds level. *** Significant at the 1 percent
level.** Significant at the 5 percent level.  ††  Significant at the 6 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 3
CAC provisions and yield differentials
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2817041 
Table 4
CAC provisions and yield differentials: Country creditworthiness and quality of law
Table 4 Panel A. Regression results
dependent variable: weekly log-yields (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quality of law proxy = -- -- DLLS LLSV (EJ) LLSV (RL) Heritage PRS World Bank
CAC × -0.047 -0.265*** -0.048 0.221 -0.038 0.046 -0.047
(0.037) (0.092) (0.120) (0.185) (0.077) (0.108) (0.037)
Duration 0.278*** 0.261*** 0.271*** 0.287*** 0.279*** 0.260*** 0.260*** 0.260***
(0.018) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Size -0.008 -0.026 -0.046** -0.033* -0.036* -0.022 -0.023 -0.025
(0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Bid-Ask spread 0.034 -0.002 0.150 0.110 0.117 -0.018 -0.010 -0.013
(0.113) (0.110) (0.205) (0.229) (0.231) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111)
Turnover -0.002 -0.007 -0.010 0.005 0.004 -0.005 -0.008 -0.006
(0.036) (0.037) (0.041) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037)
Rating -0.029 0.132*** 0.103*** 0.069 0.090*** 0.099*** 0.114*** 0.101***
(0.076) (0.013) (0.022) (0.042) (0.030) (0.022) (0.017) (0.025)
Rating x CAC -0.006
(0.006)
Quality of law 0.191** -0.197* -0.241** -0.106** -0.092* -0.263
(0.090) (0.101) (0.122) (0.053) (0.054) (0.164)
Quality of law  x CAC 0.045* -0.006 -0.036* -0.006 -0.016 -0.032
(0.023) (0.015) (0.021) (0.010) (0.013) (0.029)
Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,952 10,952 10,370 10,010 10,010 10,952 10,952 10,952
Bonds 166 166 158 150 150 166 166 166
Adjusted R-squared 0.803 0.756 0.765 0.769 0.779 0.753 0.755 0.754
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Table 4 Panel B. Net impact of CACs
(1) Country= AT BE DE ES FI FR IE IT LU NL PT SI SK
-0.164*** -0.054 -0.06 -0.01 -0.137** -0.054 -0.146** -0.086*** -0.131*** -0.081 -0.254** -0.127 -0.017
(0.042) (0.071) (0.042) (0.018) (0.067) (0.067) (0.066) (0.032) (0.025) (0.084) (0.114) (0.184) (0.090)
[5.0%] [17.0%] [6.1%] [13.0%] [3.8%] [10.3%] [2.6%] [21.2%] [1.4%] [6.2%] [6.3%] [1.9%] [5.3%]
(2) Rating= AAA AA+ AA A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- BB
-0.054* -0.060** -0.067*** -0.086*** -0.093*** -0.098*** -0.105*** -0.111*** -0.124***
(0.031) (0.026) (0.021) (0.017) (0.020) (0.024) (0.029) (0.035) (0.046)
[12.6%] [12.1%] [25.0%] [5.5%] [2.8%] [3.3%] [24.0%] [8.5%] [6.3%]
(3) DLLS= 2.73 3.07 3.14 3.23 3.3 3.51 3.52 3.56 3.93 4.04 4.26 5.25
-0.143*** -0.128*** -0.125*** -0.121*** -0.118*** -0.108*** -0.108*** -0.106*** -0.090*** -0.085*** -0.075*** -0.031
(0.032) (0.026) (0.025) (0.023) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.038)
[17.9%] [6.6%] [4.0%] [10.8%] [2.8%] [6.4%] [5.3%] [1.5%] [6.7%] [22.3%] [2.0%] [13.8%]
(4) LLSV(EJ)= 5.5 6.25 6.75 8 8.75 9 9.5 10
-0.083** -0.088*** -0.092*** -0.100*** -0.104*** -0.106*** -0.109*** -0.112***
(0.041) (0.031) (0.025) (0.018) (0.021) (0.023) (0.029) (0.035)
[6.9%] [14.3%] [23.1%] [11.2%] [2.9%] [6.7%] [24.0%] [11.0%]
(5) LLSV(RL)= 7.8 8.33 8.68 8.98 9.23 10
-0.056** -0.075*** -0.088*** -0.098*** -0.107*** -0.135***
(0.027) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.029)
[17.1%] [23.1%] [6.9%] [11.2%] [6.7%] [34.9%]
(6) Heritage= 5 6 7 8 9
-0.069** -0.075*** -0.081*** -0.087*** -0.094***
(0.028) (0.020) (0.016) (0.018) (0.025)
[26.5%] [1.9%] [19.3%] [27.2%] [25.1%]
(7) PRS= 6.67 7.5 8.33 10
-0.059** -0.072*** -0.085*** -0.111***
(0.025) (0.018) (0.016) (0.028)
[26.5%] [1.9%] [52.7%] [19.0%]
(8) World Bank= 0.357 0.446 0.969 0.996 1.033 1.398 1.403 1.615 1.721 1.788 1.809 1.829 1.926
-0.058** -0.061** -0.078*** -0.079*** -0.080*** -0.092*** -0.092*** -0.099*** -0.102*** -0.104*** -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.109***
(0.028) (0.025) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028)
[15.4%] [3.1%] [1.3%] [9.0%] [3.3%] [7.4%] [11.8%] [4.3%] [1.9%] [0.9%] [4.0%] [3.4%] [2.8%]
This table presents bond-level random effects regression results to examine the net impact of country heterogeneity, issuer's creditworthiness and quality of law on the relation between CAC provisions and bond yields. The sample ranges from January 1, 2013 to
December 30, 2014 and includes 83 bonds issued after January 1, 2013 (CAC bonds) and 83 bonds issued before January 1, 2013 (matched no-CAC bonds). Definitions of the explanatory variables are provided in Table A1. The CAC indicator is interacted with
country fixed effects in column 1 and indicated with ×. Panel A reports the estimated coefficients, and below in parentheses the standard errors that are adjusted for clustering at the matched bonds level. Panel B reports the net effect of CAC provisions for indiviudal
countries (indicated by ISO-Alpha 2 country code), for salient country ratings, and for selected values of the quality of law indicators, and below in parentheses the standard errors that are adjusted for clustering at the matched bonds level. Numbers in square brackets
in Panel B refer to the percentage of the entire sample (bond-week observations) in a given country, with a given rating or with a given value of quality of law. For the World Bank rule of law index we report the 2013 values. The ISO-Alpha 2 country codes are: AT-
Austria, BE-Belgium, DE-Germany, ES-Spain, FI-Finland, FR-France, IE-Ireland, IT-Italy, LU-Luxembourg, NL-the Netherlands, PT-Portugal, SI-Slovenia, and SK-Slovakia. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant
at the 10 percent level.
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dependent variable: weekly log-yields (1) (2)
CAC -0.037 -0.024
(0.030) (0.026)
Duration 0.163*** ×
(0.026)
Size -0.044** ×
(0.021)
Bid-Ask spread 0.195** ×
(0.079)
Turnover -0.084 ×
(0.057)
Rating 0.201***
(0.029)
Bond-level Random Effects Yes Yes
Week Fixed Effects Yes -
Country Fixed Effects x (Bond characteristics) No Yes (×)
Country x Week Fixed Effects No Yes
Observations 9,440 9,440
Bonds 146 146
Adjusted R-squared 0.723 0.836
This table presents bond-level random effects regression results to examine the relation
between pseudo CAC provisions and bond yields. The sample ranges from January 1,
2011 to December 30, 2012 and includes 73 bonds issued after January 1, 2011 (pseudo
CAC bonds) and 73 bonds issued before January 1, 2011 (matched pseudo no-CAC
bonds). Definitions of the explanatory variables are provided in Table A1. Bond
characteristics interacted with country fixed effects in column 2 are indicated with ×.
Rating is not included in column 2 because it is subsumed by the interactions between
county and week fixed effects. Effects are either included ("Yes"), not included ("No")
or subsumed by other sets of effects ("-"). The table reports the estimated coefficients
and below in parentheses the standard errors that are adjusted for clustering at the
matched bonds level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5
percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 5
Pseudo CAC provisions and yield differentials (placebo)
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Table 6 Panel A. Regression results
dependent variable: weekly log-yields (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Quality of law proxy = -- DLLS LLSV (EJ) LLSV (RL) Heritage PRS World Bank
Pseudo CAC -0.097* -0.062 0.018 0.067 0.115* 0.263*** 0.029
(0.051) (0.138) (0.122) (0.262) (0.062) (0.098) (0.027)
Duration 0.163*** 0.173*** 0.179*** 0.180*** 0.172*** 0.168*** 0.169***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
Size -0.047** -0.063*** -0.064*** -0.069*** -0.042* -0.043** -0.043**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
Bid-Ask spread 0.196** 0.203** 0.190** 0.199** 0.201*** 0.203** 0.200**
(0.079) (0.083) (0.082) (0.079) (0.077) (0.080) (0.078)
Turnover -0.084 -0.077 -0.081 -0.075 -0.084 -0.088 -0.085
(0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
Rating 0.195*** 0.187*** 0.177*** 0.180*** 0.183*** 0.190*** 0.187***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.036) (0.033) (0.034) (0.032) (0.035)
Rating x Pseudo CAC -0.006
(0.006)
Quality of law 0.171*** -0.118** -0.203*** -0.084* -0.072 -0.187
(0.058) (0.053) (0.075) (0.044) (0.045) (0.136)
Quality of law  x Pseudo CAC 0.001 -0.01 -0.015 -0.021* -0.037*** -0.057*
(0.030) (0.018) (0.032) (0.011) (0.014) (0.032)
Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,440 9,198 9,116 9,116 9,440 9,440 9,440
Bonds 146 142 140 140 146 146 146
Adjusted R-squared 0.722 0.728 0.725 0.727 0.724 0.723 0.725
Table 6
Pseudo CAC provisions and yield differentials: Country creditworthiness and quality of law (placebo)
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Table 6 Panel B. Net impact of Pseudo CACs
(1) Rating= AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A BBB+ BBB BBB- BB
-0.084* -0.072* -0.060* -0.048 -0.036 -0.023 0.001 0.013 0.026 0.05
(0.046) (0.041) (0.036) (0.033) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029) (0.032) -0.035 -0.045
[23.7%] [12.2%] [17.8%] [2.5%] [3.6%] [9.4%] [24.9%] [0.1%] [4.0%] [1.9%]
(2) DLLS= 2.73 3.07 3.14 3.23 3.3 3.51 3.52 3.56 3.93 4.04 5.25
-0.061 -0.061 -0.061 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.060** -0.060** -0.059**
(0.060) (0.051) (0.049) (0.047) (0.045) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029)
[17.6%] [9.0%] [4.6%] [10.3%] [1.0%] [5.5%] [3.3%] [0.9%] [3.0%] [23.9% [20.9%]
(3) LLSV(EJ)= 5.5 6.25 6.75 8 8.75 9 9.5 10
-0.037 -0.045* -0.050** -0.062* -0.07 -0.072 -0.077 -0.082
(0.033) (0.026) (0.025) (0.033) (0.043) (0.047) (0.054) -0.062
[3.0%] [21.0%] [24.2%] [10.4%] [1.1%] [5.6%] [21.0%] [13.8%]
(4) LLSV(RL)= 7.8 8.33 8.68 8.98 9.23 10
-0.049* -0.057** -0.062** -0.067* -0.071* -0.082
(0.027) (0.025) (0.029) (0.036) (0.042) -0.063
[22.1%] [24.2%] [3.0%] [10.4%] [5.6%] [34.8%]
(5) Heritage= 5 7 8 9
0.009 -0.034 -0.055 -0.076
(0.019) (0.028) (0.037) (0.047)
[25.9%] [23.2%] [27.1%] [23.8%]
(6) PRS= 6.67 8.33 10
0.019 -0.042 -0.104**
(0.024) (0.030) (0.048)
[25.9%] [55.7%] [18.4%]
(7) World Bank= 0.421 0.572 1.026 1.176 1.404 1.44 1.607 1.765 1.802 1.811 1.814 1.956
0.005 -0.004 -0.029 -0.038 -0.051 -0.053 -0.062 -0.071 -0.073 -0.074 -0.074 -0.082
(0.021) (0.021) (0.026) (0.029) (0.035) (0.036) (0.040) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.050)
[17.1%] [1.9%] [1.9%] [14.3%] [13.1%] [7.1%] [4.1%] [1.0%] [0.9%] [2.1%] [6.2%] [3.2%]
This table presents bond-level mixed random effects regression results to examine the net impact of issuer’s creditworthiness and quality of law on the relation between pseudo CAC provisions and bond yields. The sample ranges from January 1, 2011
to December 30, 2012 and includes 73 bonds issued after January 1, 2011 (pseudo CAC bonds) and 73 bonds issued before January 1, 2011 (matched pseudo no-CAC bonds). Definitions of the explanatory variables are provided in Table A1. Panel A
reports the estimated coefficients, and below in parentheses the standard errors that are adjusted for clustering at the matched bonds level. Panel B reports the net effect of pseudo CAC provisions for salient country ratings and for selected values of the
quality of law indicators, and below in parentheses the standard errors that are adjusted for clustering at the matched bonds level. Numbers in square brackets in Panel B refer to the percentage of the entire sample (bond-week observations) with a given
rating or with a given value of quality of law. For the World Bank rule of law index we report the 2011 values. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Panel A: Main variables
Variable Description Unit/Scale
CAC =1 if bond has CAC provisions, =0 otherwise 0/1
Pseudo CAC =1 if bond issued between Jan 2011 and June 2012, =0 otherwise 0/1
Duration Macaulay Duration-0.5×(Convexity/100) -
Size Amount outstanding Mln € (log)
Bid-Ask spread Percentage bid-ask spread (PASK-PBID)/PMID %
Turnover Traded volume across exchanges /Amount outstanding Decimals
Rating S&P local currency LT debt issuer rating 1(AAA) to 12(BB)
Panel B. Quality of law proxies
Variable name Acronym Description Source
Min-max sample values
[country code]
Formalism Index DLLS «Substantive and procedural statutory intervention in judicial cases at lower-level civil trial courts.» (7
point scale, good to bad). Not available for Slovakia.
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer,
Courts, 2003, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118,
2(1), 453-517
2.73 [BE] 
5.25 [ES]
Judicial Efficiency Index LLSV (EJ) «Efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, particularly foreign firms.»
(10 point scale, bad to good). Not available for Luxembourg, Slovakia and Slovenia.
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny, Law
and Finance, Journal of Political Economy , 1998,
106(6), 1113-1155
5.5 [PT] 
10 [FI, NL]
Rule of Law Index LLSV (RL) «Law and order tradition.» (10 point scale, bad to good). Not available for Luxembourg, Slovakia and
Slovenia.
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny, Law
and Finance, Journal of Political Economy , 1998,
106(6), 1113-1155
7.8 [ES, IE] 
10 [AT, BE, FI, NL]
Property Rights Index Heritage «The extent to which a country’s legal framework allows individuals to accumulate private property
freely, secured by clear laws that the government enforces effectively.» (100 point original scale;
rescaled on a 10 point scale, bad to good). Contemporaneous values.
Heritage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom 
https://www.heritage.org/index/
5 [IT] 
9 [AT, DE, FI, IE, LU, NL]
Law and Order Index PRS «Law and Order” form a single component, but its two elements are assessed separately, with each
element being scored from zero to three points. To assess the “Law” element, the strength and
impartiality of the legal system are considered, while the “Order” element is an assessment of popular
observance of the law.» (6 point original scale; rescaled on a 10 point scale, bad to good). Lagged
values.
PRS Group/ICRG Political Risk Rating 
https://www.prsgroup.com/ 
6.67 [IT, SK] 
10 [AT, FI, IE, LU, NL]
Rule of Law Index World Bank «Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.». (5 point scale from -2.5 to 2.5, bad to
good). Lagged values.
World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators 
http://databank.worldbank.org/  (2014 update)
0.357 [IT] 
1.943 [FI]
This table provides a detailed description of our variables. Panel A: ratings are measured every Friday; all other variables are weekly averages of daily values. Data source is Bloomberg. Panel B: data source as indicated. December values
for PRS sourced from https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/prs.xlsx. The ISO-Alpha 2 country codes are: AT-Austria, BE-Belgium, DE-Germany, ES-Spain, FI-Finland, FR-France, IE-Ireland, IT-Italy, LU-Luxembourg, NL-the
Netherlands, PT-Portugal, SI-Slovenia, and SK-Slovakia.
Definition of variables
Appendix Table A1
